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ABSTRACT Insider attacks are becoming increasingly detrimental and frequent, affecting critical infras-
tructure at a massive scale. Recent attacks such as the U.K. National Health Service WannaCry ransomware
attackwhich partly depends on internal users for initial infection highlight the increasing role of themalicious
insiders in cyber-attack campaigns. The objective of this research is to ascertain the existing technological
capability to mitigate insider threats within computer security systems by way of a mixed-method systematic
review. Evidence was acquired from major sources of mainstream and grey literature by analyzing about
300 000 papers. Crude aggregated results were analyzed across the literature, and the results were TPR 0.75,
FPR 0.32, σ 0.24 and 0.36, respectively, and σ 2 0.06 and 0.13, respectively. In totality, the literature evidence
suggests that there is high heterogeneity across crude data indicating that the effectiveness of security
measures varies significantly. No solution is able to totally mitigate an insider threat. Themes when set
against that data suggest that most, if not all, security measures require breaches to occur before an analysis
of malicious activity can prevent it in future through recall. Such a reactive approach is not effective to
protect our critical infrastructure including our healthcare systems. Consequently, there is a major theoretical
shortfall in current cyber defence architecture.
INDEX TERMS Critical infrastructure security, personal data safety, healthcare, data breach, insider threat,
meta-data, sabotage, systematic review, thematic analysis, unprivileged, untrusted, zero trust.
I. INTRODUCTION
There are more data breaches reported now every year than
one could care to count [1]. A significant percentage of these
breaches were experienced in critical national infrastruc-
ture, which includes public health sector, power, communi-
cations, transportation, oil and gas, and financial institutions.
In wartime, these are often designated as preferred mili-
tary targets, which when compromised, will cause public
panic, disconnection of communications and disruption to
transportation. Today, the world is in the infancy phase
of electronic warfare. Cyber attacks offer the ability to
destroy or disrupt infrastructure targets remotely and anony-
mously, in very stealthy ways. In the healthcare sector for
example, many corporations are interlinked with the govern-
ment, and hence, data breaches can have a destructive impact
on an entire nation. Citizens confidence and the economy
will be affected by data compromise as many companies that
operate public services also have other government contracts
and interactions.
One of the major contributing factors to the increasing
prevalence of ‘‘data disasters’’ is the inability to resolve the
age-old problem of what happens when either (i) a person
trusted to use a computer system betrays its owner to commit
cybercrimes, (ii) a hacker casually makes his way past a fire-
wall and sits behind it for some time committing cybercrimes
to the almost certain ignorance of the system administrators.
It is suggested by some commentators such as [2] that security
often works like an onion with layers upon layers of security
zones. It suggests that all it takes is for an inside threat to
slip between security zones and they will become virtually
undetectable, particularly if novel threats.
Catastrophic data breaches are becoming the story of the
day increasingly often. Most recently, as at the date of pub-
lication, was the Equifax data breach in which potentially
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information on 143million US citizens and 44million British
citizens was stolen by hackers in May-July 2017. Before
that was the NHS cyberattack. There is the Ashley Madison
Breach, the TalkTalk breach, the OPM breach, the CIA/NSA
‘‘hacking tool’’ leaks, the Yahoo data breach, the Sony data
breach, the MySpace data breach and so on – these organi-
sations are not small players. These particular breaches have
been apparently focussed on theft, but it would be right to
question what would happen if instead they chose to sabotage
or intentionally compromise a system or infrastructure in
such a way as to seriously endanger life. This is increasingly
relevant due to the role of cyberwarfare in statecraft.
Where it concerns healthcare specifically, cybersecurity
has the potential to threaten life very easily. Most NHS trusts
in England and Wales have application services presented
as web applications with various backing stores, the most
common being static file stores and databases. These are
served at desktops, mobile devices and on ubiquitous devices
(including medical equipment such as patient monitors).
If these services become compromised or are successfully
attacked, then critical internal infrastructure services such
as access to laboratory results, radiography and real-time
patient physiological information will be unavailable. Medi-
cal devices themselves can also be compromised, for example
by DDoS on the wifi networks which they use to commu-
nicate with central monitoring stations. There is the addi-
tional danger of data theft owing to the exchange of data
across so many devices. The Verizon VCDB dataset shows
that over 1200 serious attacks were directed specifically
towards healthcare infrastructure, which it identifies to be
an increasing trend [3]. The recent NHS WannaCry attack is
said by the National Audit Office to be the largest of its kind
affecting a healthcare organisation in recorded history [4].
Embarrassingly, that report confirms that the NHS was not
even a specific target, but had failed to comply with policy
directions for the improvement of infrastructure and was still
widely using Windows XP that was at that time no longer
supported by Microsoft.
In a critical infrastructure context, the problem was that
policy was clearly disengaged from front-line practice in the
NHS [4]. One industrial research report illustrates that on
more than 51% of occasions, the blame for a cybersecurity
breach is negligent internal [5]. Similarly, another report pro-
jected that cybersecurity breaches were likely to cost health-
care providers potentially ‘‘$300 billion’’ in the future [6].
The most reported cause of cybersecurity breaches is neg-
ligence, therefore, it has to be questioned how this can be
mitigated in practice. The National Audit Office identi-
fied, that had the WannaCry ransomware not been disrupted
by coincidence when a cybersecurity analyst discovered a
‘‘phone home’’ mechanism by accident, then it is likely
that significantly more devastation would have occurred [4].
Therefore, this scoping exercise must be conducted to under-
stand the threat of internally-directed attacks in critical infras-
tructure such as in a healthcare setting like the NHS.
In the present threat climate, it is reasonable to question
whether security breaches must be as a result of something
more than a failure to follow best practices and why exist-
ing measures are ineffective. This mixed-method systematic
review aims to investigate precisely that issue. A systematic
review is an evidence-based literature review which goes
beyond an ordinary review in rigorously assessing the qual-
ity of the literature using methods approved by the body
of academic opinion. This approach was used because of
the number of dogmatic practices in cybersecurity and little
encompassing research which challenges that position as
being unsatisfactory, it aims to be a fresh alternative to the
typical survey of computer science literature which provides
thorough critical analysis.
We have chosen the systematic review style to address
the shortage of knowledge about effects of insider threats
against security of critical infrastructure, particularly in the
healthcare sector, because it is a highly approved academic
scoping method within public health in the United Kingdom
and abroad. This is owed mostly to the fact that systematic
reviews are impartial and concise with adherence to a specific
protocol. It amounts to an excellent tool for ‘‘proving’’ the
state of the art as opposed to a subjective (potentially biased)
literature summary in a survey context. The closest work
to ours is the systematic literature review of insider threats
offered by [7]. However, they have utilised a challenge
metric which compounds potential differences affecting per-
formance and effectiveness metrics for specified algorithms
in Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (IDPS), thus
harmonising data to fit a meta-analysis which would other-
wise be inappropriate (this also introduces a substantial risk
of bias). As a result, there is an opportunity to conduct an
updated systematic review more relevant to internal threats.
The objective of this systematic review is to ascertain the
state of the art in computer security where the ability to
mitigate insider threats within computer security systems is
concerned in particular, especially as it relates to critical
public infrastructure such as in the healthcare setting. It aims
to extract data from the literature using mixed qualitative
and quantitative methods. The quantitative data extracted will
be explored in the context of qualitative themes in narrative
synthesis lending itself to the mixed method extraction of
data from studies. To achieve this aim, the following research
questions will be answered:
1) To what extent are current technologies able to mitigate
insider threats which abuse privilege?
2) What is the current research trend for insider threat
mitigation?
3) What are the most effective methods of mitigating
insider threats?
This systematic review is only concerned with the effec-
tiveness of existing security measures to mitigate inside
threats, the present research trend and the extent current tech-
nology is able to mitigate internal threats within a computer
security system.
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The rest of this paper is organised as follows: Section II
presents the systematic review methodology. Section III
presents the systematic review results. Section IV discusses
the review results. Section V gives recommendation for
practice and associated theoretical implications. Section VI
concludes the paper and gives future research directions.
II. METHODOLOGY
The following databases were searched: ACM Digital
Library, BASE (GreyLiterature), Collection of Computer Sci-
ence Bibliographies, DANS (Grey Literature), dblp (Grey
Literature), IEEE Xplore, JStor, OpenGrey (Grey Literature),
ScienceDirect, Springer, Wiley, Zetoc (Grey Literature).
There were two reviewers. The search returned 2577 results,
of which 474 were duplicates, leaving the actual number of
results at 2103. The search terms usedwere as follows: ((com-
puter AND (misuse OR abuse)) OR (inside* NEAR
threat), ((computer AND (misuse OR abuse)) OR (inside*
NEAR threat)) AND (unprivileged OR trust OR privi-
lege), (unprivileged). The literature search was intentionally
cast wide to consider as many results as possible in con-
nection with the research questions posed in this systematic
review.
Grey literature was searched to avoid publication bias. All
results were blinded as to publication status during the sifting
phase. The review protocol is summarised in Figure 1 and a
statistical summary of the results returned for each database
search are included at Table 1.
TABLE 1. Results summary.
A. SELECTION OF STUDIES
The sifting phase is where each individual piece of literature
was assessed against the inclusion and exclusion criteria and
a decision made as to whether it should be excluded or not.
The sifting process was divided into following six phases.
In the first phase, search results were filtered according
to the inclusion and exclusion criteria, specifically the date
and the academic field concerned. In this case, studies were
selected from the past 9 years in the field of computing.
The reason studies were not selected prior to 9 years ago is
because of the rapidly developing state of the literature in that
time which casts the relevance of earlier studies into doubt.
More than 300,000 results were excluded at this stage.
In the second phase, all results were sifted based on appar-
ent relevance to the research questions by title and abstract
alone. 1195 results were excluded.
In the third phase, the remaining results were sifted on
specificity by way of full reading. The full text article had to
relate closely enough to the research questions posed in this
systematic review. 720 results were excluded at that point.
In the fourth phase, all results were checked in detail
for the presence of sufficient data which was appropriate
in context to the research question posed (‘‘effectiveness’’).
Many results were excluded because they measured only
computing performance of a purported novel algorithm, not
effectiveness. Thus, 96 results were excluded at this point.
In the fifth stage, all results were checked for quality
using standardised testing tools for quantitative and quali-
tative research (see III-A). The results were further scored
against set quality criteria within the protocol of the system-
atic review. A total of 22 results were excluded at this stage
as having not met the minimum criteria of quality.
A total of 70 studies remained to be considered for
inclusion by way of full critical analysis. Of the available
70 studies, 18 were included and the rest (52) were discarded
either because they scored less than R4 for relevancy or had
higher than B1 for risk of bias. The remaining 18 were
fully analysed. None of the 18 remaining results were from
grey literature sources. Though it was within the criteria that
studies should have a high impact, some borderline studies
were included to avoid bias despite being low impact. A full
result set can be found in [8].
The assessment process was stringent to ensure that only
the highest quality studies with solid findings were consid-
ered for mixed-method synthesis due to the risk that detail
could otherwise be abstracted by the methodology or a poor
complementary synthesis. Borderline studies were excluded
which had relevance scores of R3 or bias scores of B2.
This was to avoid any potential risk of bias within the data
extraction and synthesis. Borderline cases which had low
impact were still considered as a mitigation against the risk
of publication bias.
B. QUALITY ASSESSMENT
Quality for the research studies was broadly assessed in four
ways. Qualitative studies were critically appraised using the
CASP tool [9] for qualitative research, which is a well-
established method of qualitative critical appraisal. Quan-
titative studies were assessed using the SURE [10] critical
appraisal tool which is a generic quantitative research assess-
ment tool well-suited to the field of computer science due
to heterogeneity of methodologies within studies. Any grey
literature was assessed using the AACODS critical appraisal
tool [11]. Following critical appraisal, studies were then
judged against the quality criteria of the review itself as set
down in the protocol (see Appendix).
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C. DATA EXTRACTION
This is amixedmethod systematic review undertaking Joanna
Briggs Institute (JBI) approach [12]. This approach provides
an evidence-based methodology for combining the results
of qualitative and quantitative research. In this systematic
review, included studies were analysed in both a quantitative
and qualitative manner and so this is favourable. There were
two reasons for this: (i) there were mixed qualitative and
quantitative studies, though the majority were quantitative
(ii) more data existed than the quantitative data provided in
the studies alone.
The approach taken to analysing the quantitative and qual-
itative data contained in the studies was to take a two stage
process. In the first stage, results and discussion were anal-
ysed for key findings and moments of importance to the
objectives of those studies. These were converted to textual
descriptions which were then further thematically analysed
blinded as to the author or article title. The textual descrip-
tions were coded and then themes were extracted from the
codes emerging from the textual descriptions.
Then, from extracted quantitative data, common measures
of results were identified and the figures extracted for fur-
ther statistical analysis. Meta-analysis was planned but did
not proceed because study methodology and sample sizes,
alongwith factors affecting results, were too heterogeneous to
safely perform a meta-analysis. Instead, the result measures
were aggregated using a crude grand mean for True Positive
Rate (TPR) and False Positive Rate (FPR) for those studies
that provided those values.
III. RESULTS
A. EXTRACTED QUALITATIVE DATA
As described in Section II, all research papers were explored
for moments of importance using the phenomenological
approach of thematic analysis. Though the majority of the
studies were not themselves qualitative, the JBI approach of
textually describing key moments in the quantitative studies
provided significant qualitative data which could then be used
for thematic analysis. The textual descriptions were coded
and then key themes extracted from recurring and similar
codes. The textual descriptions and full thematic analysis can
be viewed in [8]
A frequency chart of codes is provided in Fig. 2 and
a statistical breakdown of the emergent themes in the
thematic analysis in Table 2. It is apparent that the most com-
mon codes are: anomaly detection (8), comparison of user
behaviour (8), machine learning (6), behaviour profiling (11),
context dependent (5), low accuracy (4), malicious insider
undeterred (4), algorithm optimisation (4) and improvement
of algorithm (5).
Themost common themes are: anomaly detection (11.5%),
context dependence (14.9%), profiling (21.8%), accu-
racy (10.3%), scalability (13.8%), improvement of algo-
rithm (10.3%).
The accuracy of the analysis is confirmed by the known
fact that IDPS are the predominant mainstream utility for
FIGURE 1. PRISMA flow diagram.
TABLE 2. Breakdown of theme occurrence.
mitigating insider threats. Only first order themes were
derived as these appeared sufficient in quantity and quality
to address the research problems. Had the first order themes
been subjected to second order thematic analysis, the result-
ing themes would have been too inclusive.
B. EXTRACTED QUANTITATIVE DATA
All studies had result data, sample data and methodology
extracted and placed onto a spreadsheet as in [8]. That
data was then analysed for common measures. It is appar-
ent from the spreadsheet used in the systematic review that
12 of 18 articles had a common measure of True Positive
Rate (TPR), whilst 7 of 18 articles had a common measure
of False-Positive Rate (FPR).
It was noted from the results that a common way of assess-
ing TPR and FPR together is by constructing a Receiver Oper-
ating Characteristic (ROC) curve in which a given ROC curve
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FIGURE 2. Frequency of code occurrence.
generated from reported results in individual studies, or their
crudely aggregated results, could be used to assess study
results against the theoretical ideal of TPR 1.0 and FPR 0.0.
In this case, it was justifiable to aggregate study results
because not all studies report TPR and FPR together. Since
studymethod and sample size are heterogeneous, it is not pos-
sible to weight means together or analyse risk ratios or odds
ratios for known influential factors in each study. Thus meta-
analysis is not feasible nor is a weighted average TPR and
FPR in respect of each study since this would completely lose
the resolution of the data.
The crudely aggregated grand mean was taken from mean
values of the lowest TPR/FPR and the highest TPR/FPR
reported in each study. Some studies did not provide detailed
data but instead an author-calculated mean TPR/FPR. Thus,
it was reasonable to aggregate all mean TPR/FPR values.
Mean lowest and highest reported TPR/FPR values were
used to construct an aggregated ROC curve in respect
of 13/18 studies included in the systematic review. It should
be borne in mind that quantitative non-inclusivity is 27.78%
in respect of resultant values. This is, however, mitigated by
qualitative analysis.
The aggregated grand mean was TPR 0.75 and FPR 0.32.
Euclidean distance from the ideal is 0.25 for aggregated
mean TPR and 0.32 for aggregated mean FPR, which is
numerically significant. Mean lowest reported TPR and FPR
were 0.57 and 0.17 respectively. Highest reported TPR and
FPR were 0.84 and 0.36 respectively. The mean range for
FIGURE 3. ROC curve for mean and ideal values of FPR and TPR.
reported TPR and FPR values were 0.31 and 0.17 respec-
tively. Variances among mean TPR and FPR were 0.06
and 0.13 respectively. Standard deviations among mean
reported TPR and FPR were 0.24 and 0.36 respectively.
The detailed TPR and FPR values for each study are listed
in Table 3. The ROC curve for ideal and actual grand mean
values are presented in Fig. 3. It is notable that actual results
are markedly below the theoretical ideal in the ROC graph.
IV. DISCUSSION
The significance of an inside threat was much dependent on
the context in which the user acts maliciously. Both studies
conclude, on the basis of apparently sound findings, that
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TABLE 3. TPR and FPR values for included studies.
context was extremely subjective and thus it was impossible
to adjust detection systems to be more or less sensitive to
a particular context-based indicator. Both studies identify
that the future research direction should be focussed towards
discriminating context, perhaps by combining multiple IDPS
technologies together to narrow the subjectivity of malicious
contexts.
Both of these studies had a moderately high FPR and so
the quantitative data reported in each study tends to sup-
port, rather than contradict, the qualitative data extracted
from those studies. [13], which proposes the high impact
SNAD algorithm, identifies that the algorithm struggles to
identify malicious activity where expected user behaviour
is extremely homogeneous. In support of the above studies,
it finds that a future research direction will inevitably be
to develop semantic models of user behaviour in order to
underline context in malicious activity in insiders.
A. PROFILING
Profiling also features strongly within the literature at 21.8%
occurrence within thematic analysis. Of 18 studies, 11 high-
lighted profiling as an important element. This confirms that
roughly 2/3 of the studies included in the systematic review
use historic behavioural data to examine anomalies poten-
tially disclosing an inside threat.
The TPR values among methods using historic profiling
are higher as are FPR values, when compared to non-profiling
methods of IDPS. Non-profiling methods of IDPS appear
to identify a numerically significant lower reported value of
TPR and FPR. It is difficult to explain with precision the
reason for this, but it is likely on the evidence available within
the systematic review that this is accounted for by the fact that
an IDPS which holds no historic data can not be prejudiced
by historic data so as to exclude it at some future time.
A possible attack surface of profile-based IDPS technolo-
gies is that a malicious insider is either able to skew the
historic profile to repudiate their activity or they are able
to normalise malicious activity. Whilst non-profiling IDPS
technologies report a lower TPR and FPR, they are not
vulnerable to this phenomenon. A number of studies within
the systematic review such as [14] identify that improved
signature generation is an area of future works for this reason.
B. ACCURACY
Accuracy features moderately as a theme within the literature
with an occurrence at 10.3%.
It is a major problem within IDPS systems. In thematic
analysis, 9 codes were related to serious accuracy problems
within IDPS systems. The most inaccurate were the alarm-
based anomaly detection system investigated by [15], with
less than a 20% detection rate, and the RADISH system
in [16] with a 50% detection rate. The rates of detection do not
represent a poor study outcome or indeed a poor study (this
would have been a publication bias), however it does present
the need for significant further investigation.
Of the 12 studies the reported TPR and FPR values, it is
apparent that their aggregated values fall significantly below
the ideal ROC curve in Fig. 3. Given the context of the
systematic review in investigating internal threats, this feature
is important because as had already been described, one
malicious activity is enough to be catastrophic.
The inability of any study to reliably prove a 100% TPR
suggests that IDPS is not generally designed to prevent the
types of inside malicious activity that are resulting in major
data breaches. The tabulated range of the TPR and FPR values
reported in studies appears to confirm the same problem.
C. SCALABILITY
The theme of scalability was moderately emergent within
included studies at 13.8%. Studies included in the system-
atic review reported a mixture of scalability issues. These
included the need for greater flexibility in scaling up detection
resources, issues with the flexibility of revocation of access
and the ability of IDPS systems to cope with much larger
volumes of data for analysis.
References [13] and [17] particularly highlight that when
IDPS systems are scaled, naturally their TPR and FPR rates
are adjusted, often because of increased inaccuracy at higher
volumes. References [16] and [18] suggest that the only real
way of addressing scalability issues is by combining multiple
security methods to mitigate the effect of scalability. How-
ever, those studies do stop short of testing this approach and
identify this as an area of future work, thus it is not possible
to conclude with any level of precision whether taking that
modified approach would be effective.
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In particular, the scalability issues identified in the lit-
erature create concerns where big data and cloud services
are concerned. If an IDPS can not be scaled up, then it is
reasonable to question whether it can mitigate threats in a
complex distributed computer system where system activity
may exponentially increase over time. Despite this, there does
not appear to be any data within these studies to prove that
there would definitely be a scalability problem in respect of
each approach taken.
D. MACHINE LEARNING
Machine learning features less within the literature at a 6.9%
theme occurrence. This is still significant. From the studies
included in the systematic review, it is reasonable to conclude
that machine learning in IDPS is an emerging academic inter-
est. Studies take a mixed approach to application of machine
learning in IDPS systems.
Reference [19] appears to be the earliest article of all
studies included, which uses petri nets to classify whether
user activities are taking place in an acceptable order. Con-
versely, [20] uses finite statemachines to create a fuzzymodel
of malicious activity which can then be subject to binary
decisions based on set threshold. References [13] and [21] are
studies which also apply inductive machine learning models
to determine the definition of anomalous behaviour. Other
studies use k-nn and k-decision tree machine learning algo-
rithms, such as in the RADISH system [16].
It is highly notable that in every study except SNAD [13],
the detection rate is extremely high, with high values of TPR
and low values of FPR. The TPR and FPR values are quite
close to ideal, with a low Euclidean distance in respect of the
same. Though this is observed, of 5 studies using machine
learning, only two use real-world data to test the machine
learning algorithms posed. It is therefore not possible to
conclude with any degree of precision how well machine-
learning based IDPS would tolerate real world malicious
insider activity.
E. MALICIOUS INSIDERS UNDETERRED
The theme of malicious users being undeterred represents a
small but statistically significant occurrence at 4.6%.
In quantitative studies, particularly [22], it was proven
statistically that even though users said they would act dif-
ferently in the knowledge of honeytokens, those that did
know about the honeytokens were not at all deterred. There
are serious drawbacks with the approach taken in this study
because whilst the study was controlled and participants
blinded, as the study points out employees who could face
disciplinary action and potentially prosecutionwould treat the
situation differently to students who know the exercise is a
simulation.
In theMITRE trade secrets study, [23], employees reported
that they would react differently if they were aware that their
malicious behaviour was intercepted. Regrettably, this study
does not test these results further and so it is not possible
to fully compare this study with [22]. It is noteworthy that
only 4/173 malicious actors were deterred in [22], in the
MITRE study users took significant evasive action to hide
their malicious activities. The issue likely to identify with
these studies is that a malicious insider in the real world may
behave very differently and so only limited weight can be
given to the information conveyed in these studies.
F. IMPROVEMENT OF ALGORITHM
Improvement of algorithm features as an important theme
among included studies with an occurrence of 10.3%.
Of 18 studies included in the systematic review,
5 ([21], [22], [14], [24], [25]) identified discrimination of
malicious inside threats and the need for less intervention by
an administrator as areas for significant improvement. Since
the study data does not explicitly relate to these conclusions,
it is not possible to conclude with certainty whether the
authors in these studies took an accurate position. However,
it appears on the basis of aggregated TPR and FPR values that
these conclusions may be true of all included studies.
If all included studies require improvement in the same
manner, this could explain the difference between the ROC
curves in Fig. 3. It could provide substantiation to the idea
that IDPS is not designed to deal with novel inside threats.
G. CONTROLLING RISK
The theme of controlling risk features as a small but statisti-
cally significant occurrence at 5.7%.
References [21] and [26] both suggest and propose that
risk can be controlled using a risk-reward approach. When a
user does a malicious act their trust rating is downgraded until
access is entirely denied. When a user engages in normal use,
their trust rating is restored.
This approach is useful, but because it is longitudinal it
may take time to detect malicious activities. It only takes
a single malicious activity to be catastrophic. In addition,
a malicious user may abuse the disposition of risk analysis
by normalising their behaviour as they engage in malicious
activities to repudiate their malicious acts. This is a serious
drawback with risk analysis alone. Another manner of con-
trolling trust is described in [27], but in the context of such a
dangerous exploit could be the only real solution.
It is important that of all 18 studies included, there is little
consideration of controlling risk which one could rightfully
conclude would be important since the majority of studies
confirm that a serious drawback in every case is an inability
to detect 100% of malicious activity and mitigate it. Clearly
risk control is an area where significant future research is
required.
V. COUNTERMEASURES TO COMBAT GROWING
NUMBERS OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
SECURITY BREACHES
It is submitted that the source of the ‘‘straw that broke the
camel’s back’’ security breaches is not within necessarily
unapproved security practices or software failures. This sys-
tematic review highlights that the issue is much more serious.
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The existing security technologies most commonly deployed
today require statistical induction and are often heuristic
in the absence of ‘‘experiential knowledge’’ of a potential
threat. Thus, it is suggested that the only real mitigation is
a complete redesign of computer infrastructures to not only
make all resources immutable, but to remove the ability of an
attacker to navigate resources across different infrastructure
layers. This, it is submitted, is the only way of preventing
compromise in a threat climate where a single system event
can lead to catastrophic outcomes.
It is recommended that because the majority of security
measures can not by themselves mitigate a catastrophic inside
threat to a security system, multiple security measures must
be used together to moderate otherwise substantial risk of
catastrophe.
The US Department of Health and Human Resources that
identifies in the OCR Breach Report that the majority of
incidents were data disclosure incidents, mostly operator
error, or were internal attacks that remained undetected for a
significant period of time resulting in loss and damage [28].
It appears from the literature that the best approach to be
taken is to incapacitate a malicious insider by removing data
visibility and locking out permissions entirely so that internal
privilege can not be abused. In an increased threat climate
which the literature suggests cannot be entirely mitigated, it is
extremely important that system administrators do not rely on
the automation some technologies provide and remain alert
to unusual activity that may not be automatically alerted to
them. System and software design should take into account
the need to mitigate the risk of an internal threat starting at
the very lowest level.
The literature body generally as included within this sys-
tematic review takes a common focus towards IDPS with few
studies focussing on other ways of mitigating insider threats.
This represents a deficiency in the scope of active research in
the fields of computer science and computer security.
Taken together, all studies confirm that 100% detection of
malicious insider threats are not possible and that to some
extent, malicious insiders are not deterred by in-place secu-
rity measures. This is a very important feature within the
literature.
In recent years, it is apparent that there is an increasing
trend within the literature towards predictive behavioural
modelling to identify early malicious activity before a catas-
trophic data breach, though it will be clear that these
behavioural systems take time to work and are therefore
inappropriate in dealing with zero day or other novel inside
threats.
It is important to note that the literature consensus appears
to be that ‘‘malicious insider’’ and ‘‘inside threat’’ are very
poorly defined and are applied loosely to mean a person,
whereas in practice an insider could be an outsider with
privileged internal access to a computer system.
Machine learning in recent years has become highly promi-
nent within the literature, accounting for a large number of
included studies. These studies have the highest levels of
accuracy in terms of TPR and FPR. However, the majority
of machine learning studies failed to test real-world datasets.
Accuracy features prominently in all included studies, with
those testing real-world data appearing to perform the most
poorly. The reason for this is not particularly clear but may
be because of optimistic modelling. On the whole it is clear
that no reported technique within the included literature base
can mitigate 100% of inside threats, and thus cannot prevent
a prospective single fatal breach.
The majority of studies identify that proposed algo-
rithms need significant algorithm optimisation by way of
improved signature generation, improved moderation of risk
and improved scalability. In totality, the literature suggests
that there is no way to mitigate ‘‘knockout’’ data breaches
which could effectively destroy an organisation, cause serious
data loss or pose a significant threat to personal safety as a
result of a sabotage of critical infrastructure. This is notable.
Theoretically, it appears that the only way to entirely mit-
igate an inside threat is to entirely remove privilege. It is
possible that by controlling the degrees of freedom associated
with specific permissions and data visibility, a malicious
insider can be ‘‘sandboxed’’.
It may be possible to develop a model based upon the
degrees of freedom of a computing resource and a potential
malicious insider. The present literature base as included
within this systematic review suggests that the approach that
needs to be taken is to treat all users as a threat purely because
it may not be possible to identify a malicious insider until it
is too late.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This systematic review was limited in that meta-analysis was
not possible due to heterogeneity across studies. This is a
very important remark because the resulting issue was that
quantitative data could only be synthesised within 72.22%
inclusivity. There is therefore substantial risk that quantitative
data may have been abstracted.
Whilst a qualitative methodology was applied for exactly
that reason, qualitative data may not have made up for
the absence of quantitative data which provides a temporal
dimension to the data. Due to the need for study synthesis
to be solidly founded on very reliable data and methodology
in order for qualitative analysis to be useful, only 18 studies
could be used due to issues surrounding quality and the lack
of quantitative data which was reliable and relevant. This may
have excluded a large number of potentially relevant studies
in a potentially less stringent protocol. Too many studies
focussed on performance not reliability.
The role of negligent insiders in critical healthcare infras-
tructure is only becoming more apparent. Thus, the need for
improved technology needs to be balanced against the need
for user education and policy centred around the user that
exposes critical healthcare infrastructure to catastrophe.
Significant work needs to be undertaken to create more
effective IDPS techniques. Further work also needs to be
undertaken to create a model of threat mitigation which takes
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TABLE 4. (Continued.) Systematic review protocol.
into account the unknown malicious insider whom only need
commit himself to one activity for it to be catastrophic.
Additional work also needs to be undertaken to understand
the nature of inside threats so that new technologies can be
developed around potential further findings.
APPENDIX
See Table 4.
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